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1. Introduction
On December 12
th
2015 representatives of 195 countries agreed in Paris, France, 
to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius and to even strive for an increase 
of only 1.5 degrees Celsius.
1
Climate change is caused by the emission of 
greenhouse gases, including mainly carbon (dioxide). Consequently, the 
avoidance of carbon emissions is an urgent task. The Paris Climate Change 
Convention requires the ratifying states to set up, evaluate and, of course, meet 
individual targets for emissions reductions. From an economic viewpoint, carbon 
emissions are negative externalities from value-adding activities like electricity 
production or industrial production. Therefore, the task of the government is to
price the emission of carbon and to internalize it for the polluter (Borchiellini et 
al., 2000).
By far the most important approaches to achieve such internalization are cap-and-
trade and carbon taxation. Under a cap-and-trade system the government 
distributes or sells a fixed amount of emission allowance certificates, which can 
be traded on the exchange. Carbon emitters have to hand over to the government 
an amount of emission allowance certificates according to the quantity of carbon 
they have emitted. Instead of a cap-and-trade scheme governments can also 
implement a carbon tax. Here, the emitters of carbon have to pay the government 
a certain amount of tax per ton of carbon emitted. According to Carl and Fedor 
(2016) governments all over the world collect carbon revenues of roughly 28.3 
billion US-dollars each year. While approximately 70% of the earnings from cap-
and-trade have been invested into the support of green technologies, 70% of the 
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earnings from carbon taxes just increase the general funds of the governments or 
are reimbursed to taxpayers.
The question whether a cap-and-trade system or whether a carbon tax is preferable 
has already been hotly debated in research as well as in politics. In this article we 
do not want to enter into this discussion. Nevertheless, we will from now on only 
consider carbon taxation which has a clear advantage at least from a modeling 
perspective. In particular, following Andrew et al. (2010), the state is the central 
actor under a carbon tax scheme as he can directly establish a price of carbon, i.e. 
the carbon tax rate.
The first countries to introduce a carbon tax were Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
Finland and the Netherlands (Baranzini et al., 2000). Currently, carbon taxes are 
implemented in a series of additional countries or at least parts of countries, 
including Japan, France, Switzerland and the Canadian province of British 
Columbia (Beck et al., 2015; Carl and Fedor, 2016). Please note, that carbon 
taxation and energy taxation are somehow different. Under a carbon tax the 
emission of carbon dioxide is taxed, under an energy tax, like the German Mineral 
Oil Tax, the taxation is based on the thermal value of energy products (see e.g. Al-
Abdullah, 1999).
An extensive literature stream analyzes the economic effects of carbon taxation
(see e.g. Proost and Regemorter, 1992; Zhang and Baranzini, 2004; Marron and 
Toder, 2014). Briefly summarized, carbon taxation has a negative effect on almost 
all economic variables, including GDP, consumption, international 
competitiveness, wages, social equality, and investment. Furthermore, it increases 
the prices of energy-intensive products while at least the relative prices of less 
energy-intensive products decrease. In return, carbon taxation is expected to 
encourage innovations in low-carbon technologies. Additionally, carbon taxation 
should decrease the demand for energy and energy intensive products; 
consequently also decreasing the amount of carbon emission. This latter effect has 
been empirically analyzed by Lin and Li (2011) for the first five countries 
implementing a carbon tax. However, a significant negative influence of the 
carbon tax on carbon emissions could only be showed for one of the five 
countries. Thus, for governments the right design of the carbon tax is crucial to 
achieve the desired effects (Baranzini et al., 2000; Lin and Li, 2011). 
According to Marron and Toder (2014) optimizing the carbon tax scheme consists 
of three tasks: Setting the tax rate, collecting the tax and using the resulting 
revenue. Likewise, Zhang and Baranzini, 2004 and Liang et al. (2007) show that 
not only the rate of a carbon tax is crucial, but also its use. For example as a 
subsidy for green competing technologies or as a production related re-payment 
into the market. However, for simplicity, in this paper we will only focus on the 
first task, i.e. optimizing the tax rate. Therefore, we assume that collecting the tax 
works flawlessly without creating any transaction cost and that all revenues of the 
carbon tax become part of the government’s general funds.
Some research has already done on the question how to optimize carbon tax rates. 
Many economists have argued that a carbon tax should strictly following the 
principles of a Pigovian tax, i.e. it should be exactly as high to prevent market 
failure by internalizing the negative externalities of carbon emissions to the 
emitters. For example, Roughgarden and Schneider (1999) develop a model to
optimize the carbon tax rate from a global perspective. They show, that the 
optimal carbon tax rate critically depends on the strength of the relationship 
between carbon in the atmosphere and the resulting damage; a context that is still 
being investigated by many researchers (see e.g. Pearce, 2003).
However, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) argue that as long as governments have 
more tasks to do than only preventing the climate change, it can be useful for 
them to deviate from the pure Pigovian principle and to use carbon taxation as a 
means of fiscal policy. Using a general-equilibrium approach they set up a model 
to determine the optimal carbon tax rate under the interaction with other means of 
taxation. Liski and Tahvonen (2004) set up a game-theoretic model to determine 
the optimal carbon tax rate. Interestingly they do not define optimality from an 
environmental view point but they view carbon taxes as a kind of import tariff for 
energy products that allows the importing countries to get back part of the 
monopoly rents of the OPEC cartel. For this purpose, the import countries must 
jointly select the optimal level of the carbon tax. Finally, Goulder and Mathai 
(2000) analyze the influence of the possibility of technological progress regarding 
carbon-emission-reducing technologies on the optimal carbon tax rate. In this 
regard Fahimnia et al. (2015) point out that in typical supply chains countless 
possibilities exist where investments can be made to reduce carbon emissions. 
With the help of their model decision-makers are able to filter out the most 
suitable investment options.
In this article we also deviate from the pure Pigovian principle and assume that 
governments use carbon taxation to meet several objectives. In particular, we set 
up a model of an oligopolistic market of producers that differ in production costs 
and in the degree of eco-efficiency, i.e. the ratio of production output and carbon 
emissions. The market price of the produced goods depends on the combined 
quantity offered by the oligopolistic companies and on the stochastic development 
of demand. At each point in time the oligopolistic companies non-cooperatively 
choose their optimal quantity offered. We analyze the effect of a carbon tax on the 
oligopolistic market and determine the optimal carbon tax rate from the
governments’ perspective. Finally, the possibility of one company in the 
oligopolistic market to invest in a carbon-emission-reducing project is introduced 
into the model. We use the real option approach to determine the optimal timing 
of this investment given the demand uncertainty. Furthermore, the influence of 
this investment possibility on the oligopolistic market and on the optimal carbon 
tax rate is analyzed. 
Real options have already been used by several researchers in the context of 
carbon emissions; especially to account for the flexibility associated with the 
investments possibility under the presence of uncertainty (see e.g. Insley, 2003;
Abadie and Chamorro, 2008; Lukas and Welling, 2014). In particular, following 
real option theory investors do not have to invest immediately but may wait with 
their investments until some uncertainty has resolved. The investment possibility 
thus contains a flexibility value that foregoes with investment. Real option 
methodology is also used to analyze company behavior in oligopolistic markets. 
For example, Bouis et al. (2009) analyze market entry decisions in an oligopoly of
identical companies, Hackbarth and Miao (2012) analyze mergers and 
acquisitions in an oligopoly of companies that at each time-step optimize their 
produced quantity, and Huisman and Kort (2015) model the market-entry game of 
two (potential) duopolistic companies that have to decide on the time of market 
entry and the capacity they build. 
The model of the oligopolistic market in this article builds on the model of 
Hackbarth and Miao (2012). The main advantages relevant to this article are that 
the companies may differ in production cost and can optimally choose their 
produced quantity at each time step. In particular, no capacity limit exists. 
Nevertheless, our model has slightly to deviate from the setting in Hackbarth and 
Miao (2012) as a reasonable modulation of the carbon tax requires to assign cost 
to companies that are proportional to their carbon emissions which is not possible 
in their setting. However, this deviation from Hackbarth and Miao (2012) leads to 
the disadvantage that the model in this article can only be solved numerically as it 
contains recursive calculations, because the optimal quantities offered by the 
companies in the oligopoly could otherwise become negative. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In Section 2 the model of the 
oligopolistic market is introduced and the optimal quantities of the oligopolistic 
companies are determined. Furthermore, the influence of several model 
parameters and of carbon taxation on the oligopolistic market is discussed. 
Section 3 analyzes the decision of the government. At first, the multi-criteria 
objective function is developed. Then, the optimal carbon tax rate is determined; 
in a setting with constant demand as well as under demand certainty. For both 
cases, the influence of several model parameters on the optimal carbon tax rate is 
analyzed. Section 4 discusses the influence of a company’s possibility to invest in 
a carbon emission avoiding project. Using real option methodology the optimal 
investment timing is analyzed and the effect of this investment possibility is 
discussed. Finally Section 5 concludes and gives suggestions for further research.
2. The oligopolistic model
We consider    oligopolistic companies that produce a homogenous good. 
We assume that at a time  the market price of the good linearly depends in the 
combined offered quantity (). In particular,
((), ) = 	() 
 () = 	() 
   () (1)
with 	, , () > 0 and ()  0 as the offered quantity of company
  {1, … , } at time . The production cost  > 0 of one unit of the good differs 
between companies but are independent to the quantity produced. Likewise, the 
amount of carbon  > 0 that is emitted to produce one unit of the good differs 
between companies and is independent to the quantity produced. Given a carbon 
tax of  > 0 per unit carbon, the cost () of company  to produce the quantity 
() of the homogenous good can be expressed as
() = ()( + ) (2)
Hence, at time  the profit ((), ) of company  is given by
() = ()() 
 ()
= 	() 
   ()  () 
 ()( + ) (3)
At each time  the companies compete on the oligopolistic market by choosing a 
optimal quantity to offer (Cournot-oligopoly). In particular, company  has to 
choose () in a way that it maximizes its profits () given the offered 
quantities (), . . , (), (), … , () of the other companies in the 
market. Hence, for the optimal offered quantity of company  the necessary 
condition
!"#!$(%)&#! = 0 has to hold.
Together, these  conditions of the form
0 = 	() 
 2() 
   (),' 
  
  (4)
set up a linear equation system of  equations with the offered quantities 
(), … , () as variables. The vector ($(), … , $ ()) of optimal offered 
quantities is the solution of the equation system. Please note, that this solution 
may contain negative quantities of several companies. If this is the case the 
respective companies are excluded from the market (just for the current time t) 
and their quantities $() are set to zero. For the remaining * -  companies the 
calculation is repeated. Let /3()4 denote the set of remaining companies at 
time . Then, it can be easily shown that the optimal equilibrium production of 
company   /3()4 at time  equals
$3()4 = 1(* + 1) ()	 
 * 
 * +  3 + 4536(%)4/{}  (5)
and that it solely depends on () but not directly on . The combined offered 
quantity () at time  of all  companies on the oligopolistic market is given by
$3()4 =  $3()4 =
1(* + 1) *	() 
   536(%)4 
  536(%)4 . (6)
After insertion of the optimal quantities in equation (1) we get the equilibrium 
market price at time  of
$3()4 = 1* + 1 ()	 +   536(%)4 +  536(%)4 . (7)
The profits of company   /3()4 are equal to
$((), , ) = "()	 
 * + 8 3 + 4536(%)4/{} 
 *&
9
(* + 1)9 . (8)
The total revenue of the carbon tax a t time : can be obtained as
;$3()4 =   $ 3()4. (9)
Finally, we can calculate the eco-efficiency (i.e. the ratio of output and ecological 
impact) of the oligopolistic market by
<$3()4 = 8 $ 3()48 $ 3()4. (10)
2.1 Benchmark Oligopoly
Due to the possible recursive calculation of the companies’ optimal quantities 
hardly any results regarding the carbon tax can be obtained analytically. Instead, 
we use a certain class of oligopolies consisting of  > 1 companies to 
numerically analyze the effect of the carbon tax. While the first company always 
has the characteristics  = ? > 0,  = ? > 0, the other companies deviate 
from this first company by a distance @ > 0 and @ > 0 , respectively. In 
particular, we define  = ? + @ A cos B( 
 2) 9CD and  = ? + @ A
sin B( 
 2) 9CD. Thus all the other companies lie at an even angular distance on 
an eclipse with the center formed by company 1. In particular, for  = 5 we get
 =
F
GH
?? + @?? 
 @? I
JK ,  =
F
GH
??? + @?? 
 @I
JK 
which we will call the “benchmark oligopoly”. Furthermore, unless stated 
otherwise we will assume the following remaining parameters:  = 1; 
? = 2, @ = 1; ? = 2; @ = 1;  	 = 10;   = 1;  = 0.5 . Additionally, we 
assume the following values for parameters that will be introduced and defined in 
later sections of this article: M = 0.1; N = 0.2; O = 0; P = 0.5; Q = 20.
2.2 Influence of the demand parameter R.
From equation (6) we can conclude that given a very low demand parameter none 
of the oligopolistic firms will produce a positive quantity. If the demand 
parameter increases to a certain level, the first company will start production. If it 
increases to another higher level a second company starts to produce. If it 
increases to an even higher level a third company will enter the market, et cetera 
(see Figure 1). As long as the number of active companies in the market stays 
constant, we can obtain from equation (5) that the offered quantity of each 
producing company increases in the demand parameter . However, nothing can 
be said for an increase in  that leads to a higher number of active companies in 
the market. Anyhow, Figure 1 indicates that the quantities of active companies are 
continuous as well as monotonic in .
Figure 1: The optimal quantity $ of the five oligopolistic companies in dependence of 
the demand parameter  (solid line: company 1; dashed line: company 2; dotted line: 
company 3; dashdotted line: company 4; longdashed line: company 5). 
2.3 Influence of the carbon tax
Following equation (6) we get
S$3()4S = 1(* + 1)  
T
 < 0. (11)
Thus, an increase in the carbon tax V leads to lower the combined offer $ - at 
least as long as the variation in the carbon tax does not lead to a variation in the 
number of active companies. Likewise, due to 
S$3()4S = 1* + 1  
T
 > 0. (12)
the market price of the homogenous good in the oligopoly is also increasing with 
the carbon tax if the number of active companies stays constant. According to 
Figure 2 this result also holds if an increase in the carbon tax leads to a decrease 
in the number of active companies.
Figure 2: The market price of the homogenous good in dependence of the carbon tax
rate.
However, the influence of the carbon tax on an individual company’s offered 
quantity and profit is more complex. From 
S$3()4S = 
* +  
T
,' (13)
it follows that as long as the number of active companies stays constant the 
optimal offered quantity of company  is decreasing with the carbon tax if and 
only if  > T 8 T,' , i.e. if and only if the carbon emissions of company  per 
unit of the homogenous good are quite high compared to the other companies in 
the oligopoly. For example, in Figure 3 we can see that with the exemption of 
company 4 – which is the company with the lowest carbon emission per 
production unit – the quantity of all companies is decreasing with an increase in 
the carbon tax.
Figure 3: The optimal quantity $ of the five oligopolistic companies in dependence of 
the carbon tax rate  (solid line: company 1; dashed line: company 2; dotted line: 
company 3; dashdotted line: company 4; longdashed line: company 5). 
In contrast, the quantity of company 4 is increasing with the carbon tax if the 
carbon tax is low. Only if the carbon tax is as high that company 4 is the only 
remaining active company on the market an increase in the carbon tax leads to a 
lower optimal quantity of company 4.
Obviously carbon tax schemes are usually implemented to improve the 
environment. Indeed, according to Figure 4 the carbon tax succeeds in increasing 
the eco-efficiency. As long as more than one company is active on the market an 
increase in the carbon tax leads to a higher eco-efficiency. While the combined 
quantity on the market is decreasing with the carbon tax the quantity of the low 
emission company 4 is increasing. Hence, the ratio of homogenous goods 
produced and carbon emissions is improving. If the carbon tax is as high that only 
company 4 is active in the market an increase in the carbon tax cannot further 
increase the eco-efficiency.
Figure 4: The influence of the carbon tax rate on the degree of eco-efficiency. 
Figure 5: The influence of the carbon tax rate on the revenue of the carbon tax.
It can be easily shown that the influence of the carbon tax rate on the tax revenue 
is non-monotonic. Obviously, in absence of any carbon taxation, i.e. for  = 0,
there is no tax revenue, i.e. ; = 0. Likewise, according to equation (6) for a very 
high carbon tax rate no company will be active in the market and, thus, ; = 0.
Consequently, there will be at least one maximum in between. 
As can be seen in Figure 5 also multiple maxima may exist. In particular, the tax 
revenue is first increasing with the carbon tax and reaches its global maximum for 
 W 2. Then it is decreasing with an increasing carbon tax rate until company 4 
becomes the only active company on the market. If the carbon tax rate increases 
further the tax revenue slightly increases, too and for approximately  = 4
reaches a second local maximum. Though, a further increase in the carbon tax rate 
again leads to a decreasing tax revenue.
3. The decision of the government
The task of the government is to optimally choose the carbon tax rate  .
Obviously, every government has to meet different targets at the same time. 
Consequently, the decision regarding the carbon tax is an example of multi-
criteria decision making. We assume that at every point in time  the utility of the 
government is represented by the utility function 
Y3Z(), Z9(), … , Z()4 = [ Z()\] (14)
with Z() = (Z(), … , Z()) as realization of the different targets in  and 
^ = (^, … , ^)  (
1,1) as the weight of the targets. Please note, that the 
utility function deviates from the classic Cobb-Douglas-Function by the fact that 
also negative weights can occur. In these cases the government wishes to 
minimize the specific target value. However, it always applies that a target  is the 
more important to the government the higher _ ^_. To normalize the weights we 
assume that 8 _ ^_ = 1.
In the following we will summarize the many different targets of the government 
in three groups: 
1. Targets of environmental policy
2. Targets of economic policy
3. Targets of budgetary policy. 
For each of the three groups we will now define a representing target the 
government in our model aims to achieve. The first group of targets is represented 
by the target to maximize eco-efficiency. In particular, Z(()) = <$3()4. The 
second group of targets is represented by the target to minimize the market price 
of the homogenous good. Thus, we get Z9(()) = $(()). Finally, the third 
group of targets is represented by the target to maximize the revenue of the carbon 
tax. Here we get Z`(()) = ;$3()4
Thus, we obtain the utility function of the government as
Y3()4 = "<$3()4&\a 3$(())4\b ";$3()4&\d, (15)
whereby ^  0, ^9 - 0, ^`  0 and |^| + |^9| + |^`| = 1.
3.1 The government’s decision (in a simplified economy)
For simplicity, let us first assume that the demand parameter is constant, i.e. 
() = e > 0. Hence, the government simply has to maximize Y(e) by choosing 
the optimal carbon tax rate $  0. In particular,
$ = 	MZf	ghjk{Y(e)}= 	MZf	ghjkl3<$(e)4\a3$(e)4\b3;$(e)4\dm. (16)
As we have already discussed in the previous chapter an increase in the carbon tax 
rate will result in an increase in the market price of the homogenous good. Hence, 
we have 
(p$)qbh < 0. On the other hand, an increase in the carbon tax rate leads to 
an increase in eco-efficiency. That is  (r$)qah > 0. A low market price and a high 
eco-efficiency hence are mutually contradictory goals. Furthermore, the influence 
of the carbon tax rate on the tax revenue has been shown to be non-monotonic. 
Hence, in general the sign of 
t$h is ambiguous and strongly depends on the 
relative weights ^, ^9 and ^` of the different goals. As a consequence, we can 
only numerically determine the optimal carbon tax rate  $.
Figure 6: The influence of the carbon tax rate on the utility of the government.
For the benchmark case, Figure 6 depicts the influence of the carbon tax rate on
the utility of the government. As can be seen, for the given parameters of the 
benchmark case a carbon tax of roughly 2 maximizes the government’s utility.
From Table 1 we get the exact optimal carbon tax rate $ = 1.9. While for lower 
values of  an increase of  leads to a strong increase in utility, for higher values 
of  a further increase of  only leads to a slight decrease of utility. 
Table 1: The government‘s decision in a simplified economy.$ Y$ <$ $ ;$ $ |/$|	 = 5.00 	 = 7.50 	 = 10.0 	 = 12.5 	 = 15.0
0.985 0.714 0.664 3.652 2.000 1.348 2
1.375 0.910 0.691 4.844 5.285 2.656 3
1.900 1.063 0.701 6.125 10.50 3.875 3
2.415 1.186 0.706 7.394 17.47 5.106 3
2.930 1.289 0.709 8.663 26.20 6.338 3 = 0.50  = 0.75  = 1.00  = 1.25  = 1.50
1.900 1.340 0.701 6.125 21.00 7.750 3
1.900 1.170 0.701 6.125 14.00 5.167 3
1.900 1.063 0.701 6.125 10.50 3.875 3
1.900 0.987 0.701 6.125 8.398 3.100 3
1.900 0.929 0.701 6.125 6.998 2.583 3? = 1.00 ? = 1.50 ? = 2.00 ? = 2.50 ? = 3.00
4.995 1.494 1201 5.998 0.017 4.002 2
6.985 1.267 2.000 7.746 7.871 2.254 1
1.900 1.063 0.701 6.125 10.50 3.875 3
1.460 0.974 0.500 6.123 11.33 3.878 3
1.185 0.909 0.392 6.120 11.72 3.880 3@ = 0.50 @ = 0.75 @ = 1.00 @ = 1.25 @ = 1.50
1.725 1.030 0.555 6.122 12.06 3.878 3
1.810 1.046 0.610 6.126 11.50 3.874 3
1.900 1.063 0.701 6.125 10.50 3.875 3
4.655 1.107 1.333 7.746 7.871 2.254 1
6.985 1.267 2.000 7.746 7.871 2.254 1? = 1.00 ? = 1.50 ? = 2.00 ? = 2.50 ? = 3.00
1.980 1.178 0.690 5.475 12.98 4.525 3
1.950 1.120 0.696 5.813 11.72 4.188 3
1.900 1.063 0.701 6.125 10.50 3.875 3
1.840 1.008 0.706 6.425 9.320 3.575 3
1.765 0.953 0.709 6.706 8.201 3.294 3@ = 0.50 @ = 0.75 @ = 1.00 @ = 1.25 @ = 1.50
1.715 1.046 0.700 6.001 9.796 3.999 4
1.890 1.054 0.713 6.175 10.14 3.825 3
1.900 1.063 0.701 6.125 10.50 3.875 3
1.910 1.073 0.690 6.075 10.86 3.925 3
1.915 1.082 0.680 6.019 11.22 3.981 3 = 3  = 4  = 5  = 6  = 7  = 8  = 9
3.490 1.005 1.000 7.745 7.870 2.255 1
1.860 1.026 0.632 6.325 10.82 3.675 3
1.900 1.063 0.701 6.125 10.50 3.875 3
1.815 1.090 0.718 5.839 10.52 4.161 4
2.685 1.112 0.823 6.615 11.04 3.385 2
2.385 1.147 0.800 6.127 11.55 3.873 3
2.175 1.159 0.795 5.830 11.41 4.170 4^ = 13 , ^9 = 
 13 , ^` = 13 ^ = 23 , ^9 = 
 16 , ^` = 16 ^ = 16 , ^9 = 
 23 , ^` = 16 ^ = 16 , ^9 = 
 16 , ^` = 23
1.900 1.063 0.701 6.125 10.50 3.875 3
3.490 1.003 1.000 7.745 7.870 2.255 1
0.535 0.462 0.551 4.225 5.607 5.775 5
1.945 3.342 0.707 6.181 10.51 3.819 3
For the benchmark case Table 1 depicts the influence of the various model 
parameters on the optimal carbon tax rate, on the utility of the government, on the 
fulfillment of the governmental goals, on the combined quantity of the 
homogenous good produced and on the number of active companies in the 
oligopolistic market. An increase in demand, i.e. an increase in 	, results in a 
higher optimal carbon tax rate. Furthermore, the three targets of the government, 
the combined quantity and the number of active companies increase with demand.
Contrarily, an increase of the negative influence of the combined quantity offered 
on the market price of the homogenous good, i.e. an increase of  , has no 
influence on the optimal carbon tax rate (see Table 1). This can be explained by 
the fact that according to equation (7)  has no influence on the equilibrium 
market price $. An increase of  solely leads to a lower combined quantity and 
hence to a lower tax revenue. However, the market share of the companies is not 
influenced by an increase in . Thus, an increase in  has no influence on the eco-
efficiency. Consequently, an increase in  leads to a lower utility of the 
government.
The influence of an increase in carbon emissions, i.e. an increase in ?, on the 
optimal carbon tax rate is ambiguous (see Table 1). Same holds for the influence 
on the market price of the homogenous good, on the quantity produced and on the 
number of active companies in the oligopoly. Only if carbon emissions are low an 
increase in carbon emissions leads to an increase in the carbon tax rate.
Paradoxically, if carbon emissions are high, an increase in carbon emissions 
would lead to a lower optimal carbon tax rate. Furthermore, the higher the carbon 
emissions the lower the utility of the government. Obviously, the degree of eco-
efficiency decreases with increasing carbon emissions while the tax revenue 
increases. 
The influence of the production cost of the oligopolistic companies, i.e. an 
increase in ?, has a monotonic influence on the optimal carbon tax rate. The 
higher the production costs the lower the carbon tax. Likewise, the influence of 
the production cost on the government’s utility is monotonic. The higher the 
production cost the lower is the utility. However, the influence of production cost 
on the three governmental targets does not correspond consistently to the decrease 
in utility. In particular, the higher the production cost the higher the market price 
of the homogenous good and the lower the tax revenue but the higher the eco-
efficiency (see Table 1). Interestingly, any increase in the difference between the 
oligopolistic companies, i.e. an increase in @ or @, has a positive influence on 
the optimal carbon tax rate as well as on the governments utility. Further, an 
increase in these differences leads to a reduced number of active companies in the 
oligopoly (see Table 1). All these effects can be easily explained by the fact that 
due to the special construction of the oligopolies (see section 3.1) an increase in 
the differences of the oligopolistic companies reduces carbon emissions or 
production cost of the already leading companies while simultaneously increasing 
carbon emissions and production costs of the non-leading companies.
The influence of the number of companies in the oligopoly seems to be totally 
arbitrary. In particular, its influence on any of the observed quantities is 
ambiguous. That is, its influence on the optimal carbon tax rate, on the 
government’s utility, on the market price of the homogenous good, etc. (see Table 
1). Paradoxically, even the influence of the number of companies in the oligopoly 
on the number of active companies in the oligopoly is non-monotonic! While we 
observe four active companies in an oligopoly of six companies, only two 
companies are active in an oligopoly of seven companies.
Finally, the influence of variations in the weights of the governmental targets is 
quite intuitive. An increase in the weight of eco-efficiency increases the optimal 
carbon tax rate and the degree eco-efficiency. In return the values of the other two 
targets deteriorate. Furthermore, the combined quantity is reduced and only the 
company with the lowest carbon emission stays active in the oligopoly. Likewise, 
an increase in the weight of the market price decreases the market price but has 
negative consequences with respect to eco-efficiency and tax revenue. To allow a 
decrease of the market price an increase in the weight of the market price further 
results in a lower carbon tax rate, a higher quantity produced and a greater number 
of active companies in the oligopoly. In particular, all companies become active in 
the benchmark case. Finally, an increase in the weight of the tax revenues has 
almost any influence on the quantities observed (see Table 1). 
3.2 The government’s decision under uncertainty
In the following we assume that the demand parameter () is evolving 
stochastically over time. In particular we assume that it follows the geometric 
Brownian motion
z() = O()z + N()z~(), (k) = k > 0, (17)
with O   as the exponential growth rate, N > 0 as the volatility and  ~() as the 
increment of a Standard Wiener process with mean zero and variance equal to 
z. At the initial point in time k the government has to decide on the optimal 
carbon tax rate. We assume that the government has a time preference, i.e. it puts 
a higher weight on the present than on the future. Thus, future utility is discounted 
with the exponential discount factor M > 0 . Consequently, by choosing the 
optimal carbon tax rate $ the government aims to maximize the expected integral
of future discounted utility, i.e.
$ = 	MZf	ghjk  (%%)Y3()4z%
= 	MZf	ghjk  "<$3()4&
\a "$3()4&\b ";$3()4&\d(%%) z

%
. (18)
Given the optimal carbon tax rate $ the expected discounted average produced 
quantity $ of a company  can be calculated by
$: =   
M(
0)$3()4z0  
M(
0)z0 = M A   
M(
0)$3()4z

0
. (19)
Please note, that $ is defined in a way that $ = $ if () would be constant 
over time. Thus, it makes sense to compare $ with $ of section 3.1 to determine 
the effect of uncertainty on the company’s quantity. Likewise, we define 
$  M A   (%%)$3()4z% , Y$  M A   (%%)Y$3()4z

% ,
 $  M A   (%%)$3()4z% , <$  M A   (%%)<$3()4z

% ,
 ;$: = M A   (%%)$3()4z% , _/$_: = M A   (%%)_/$3()4_z% . 
For the benchmark case the model is solved numerically using Monte-Carlo 
simulation. In particular, thousand realizations of the stochastic processes ()
have been simulated over a time span of fifty years with exactly one time step per 
year. For the time span after year 50 a constant exponential growth of (t) with 
the growth rate O was assumed, starting from the simulated value (k + 50). The 
results of the Monte-Carlo simulation are given in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2: The government‘s decision under demand uncertainty (part 1).$ Y$ <$ $ ;$ $ _/$_	 = 5.00 	 = 7.50 	 = 10.0 	 = 12.5 	 = 15.0
0.680 0.551 0.486 2.774 1.972 1.708 1.967
0.940 0.730 0.543 3.737 4.925 3.135 2.654
1.590 0.875 0.617 4.976 10.60 4.186 2.672
1.650 0.989 0.628 5.711 15.95 5.895 3.130
2.240 1.093 0.649 6.903 25.25 7.024 3.043 = 0.50  = 0.75  = 1.00  = 1.25  = 1.50
1.590 1.103 0.617 4.976 21.20 8.372 2.672
1.590 0.963 0.617 4.976 14.13 5.582 2.672
1.590 0.875 0.617 4.976 10.60 4.186 2.672
1.590 0.813 0.617 4.976 8.481 3.349 2.672
1.590 0.765 0.617 4.976 7.067 2.791 2.672? = 1.00 ? = 1.50 ? = 2.00 ? = 2.50 ? = 3.00
1.490 1.072 4.800 4.051 4.941 5.290 3.237
3.360 1.013 1.406 5.605 10.02 3.558 1.760
1.590 0.875 0.617 4.976 10.60 4.186 2.672
1.100 0.798 0.423 4.796 10.49 4.366 2.971
0.880 0.744 0.329 4.759 10.59 4.404 3.028@ = 0.50 @ = 0.75 @ = 1.00 @ = 1.25 @ = 1.50
1.280 0.847 0.467 4.730 10.77 4.432 3.227
1.350 0.857 0.514 4.778 10.52 4.385 3.028
1.590 0.875 0.617 4.976 10.60 4.186 2.672
2.060 0.905 0.853 5.312 10.32 3.850 2.214
5.170 0.982 1.606 6.235 9.230 2.730 0.940? = 1.00 ? = 1.50 ? = 2.00 ? = 2.50 ? = 3.00
1.590 1.009 0.633 4.444 12.34 4.840 2.926
1.390 0.939 0.619 4.554 10.75 4.731 2.963
1.590 0.875 0.617 4.976 10.60 4.186 2.672
1.380 0.813 0.601 5.072 9.191 4.091 2.702
1.570 0.754 0.591 5.371 8.956 3.594 2.411@ = 0.50 @ = 0.75 @ = 1.00 @ = 1.25 @ = 1.50
1.610 0.863 0.652 5.061 10.35 4.101 2.838
1.640 0.869 0.641 5.066 10.55 4.097 2.649
1.590 0.875 0.617 4.976 10.60 4.186 2.672
1.640 0.884 0.604 4.984 10.95 4.178 2.481
1.580 0.894 0.570 4.872 11.02 4.291 2.522 = 3  = 4  = 5  = 6  = 7  = 8  = 9
1.800 0.819 0.732 5.628 9.056 3.534 1.682
1.570 0.845 0.548 5.184 10.53 3.978 2.381
1.590 0.875 0.617 4.976 10.60 4.186 2.672
1.680 0.902 0.635 4.905 10.95 4.257 3.039
1.640 0.920 0.639 4.734 10.87 4.429 3.477
1.780 0.934 0.667 4.753 11.29 4.409 3.204
1.740 0.955 0.665 4.615 11.28 4.548 3.544^ = 13 , ^9 = 
 13 , ^` = 13 ^ = 23 , ^9 = 
 16 , ^` = 16 ^ = 16 , ^9 = 
 23 , ^` = 16 ^ = 16 , ^9 = 
 16 , ^` = 23
1.590 0.875 0.617 4.976 10.60 4.186 2.672
2.850 0.748 0.713 5.913 12.07 3.052 1.718
0.430 0.425 0.514 3.724 4.525 5.617 3.878
2.180 2.921 0.641 5.359 11.71 3.606 2.177
If we compare the results of the setting under demand uncertainty (Table 2) with 
the setting of constant demand (Table 1), we first see that demand uncertainty 
results in a lower optimal carbon tax rate, at least in the benchmark case. The 
same result also is valid for all other observed settings with the exemption of the 
case where the government puts a very high weight on tax revenue. Here, demand 
uncertainty slightly increases the optimal carbon tax rate. Furthermore, 
uncertainty has a clear negative effect on the government’s ability to meet the 
objectives. In all settings the value of  Y$ is lower than the value of Y$. This result 
can be explained easily, as under certainty the government can adjust the tax rate 
perfectly to its objectives and to their weights. In contrast, under demand 
uncertainty the government has to choose a tax rate that has to fit as best as 
possible into a variety of future scenarios. Obviously, it cannot be perfect for all 
scenarios, i.e. all realizations of () . Likewise, with only one exemption, 
particularly a very high weight on the market price of the homogenous good, in all 
settings demand uncertainty leads to a lower eco-efficiency of the oligopolistic 
market. This result can be explained analogously. 
However, if we analyze the effect of demand uncertainty on the market price of 
the homogenous good and on the revenue of the carbon tax, we find quite 
amazing results. In all settings under demand uncertainty the market price of the 
homogenous good is lower. Of course, simultaneously the combined offered 
quantity is higher. This effect can be explained by the lower carbon tax rate. With 
respect to the tax revenue the effect of uncertainty is ambiguous. In some settings, 
including the benchmark case demand uncertainty results in a higher tax revenue, 
but in other settings under uncertainty the tax revenue is lower. This difference in 
the effect of uncertainty can be explained by the fact that tax revenue 
multiplicatively consists of three parts: Tax rate, the reciprocal of eco-efficiency, 
i.e. the average carbon emissions per unit of the homogenous good produced, and 
the combined offered quantity of the oligopolistic companies. While the tax rate 
decreases with demand uncertainty, the reciprocal of eco-efficiency and the 
combined offered quantity increase in uncertainty. Further, demand uncertainty 
has neither a clear effect on tax revenue nor on the number of active companies.
A higher interest rate leads to a higher optimal carbon tax rate (see Table 3). 
Further, the higher the interest rate the higher the utility of the government. This 
effect is solely triggered by a strong increase in eco-efficiency. The market price 
is increasing with the interest rate and the tax revenue is decreasing with the 
interest rate. A higher growth rate of demand leads to a higher carbon tax rate, 
higher utility of the government and higher tax revenue. Obviously, higher growth 
in demand increases the market price of the homogenous good. Paradoxically, a 
higher growth rate of demand seems to be beneficial for the environment as it 
increases eco-efficiency. However, due to the increased combined quantity 
offered carbon emissions could nevertheless increase.
Table 3: The government‘s decision under demand uncertainty (part 2).$ Y$ <$ $ ;$ $ _/$_O = 
0.050 O = 
0.025 O = 0 O = 0.025 O = 0.050
0.910 0.669 0.492 3.417 4.342 2.871 2.640
1.500 0.765 0.571 4.283 7.565 3.223 2.284
1.590 0.875 0.617 4.976 10.60 4.186 2.672
1.820 0.993 0.650 6.003 18.70 6.201 2.880
2.490 1.130 0.698 7.942 42.46 9.941 2.815M = 0.050 M = 0.075 M = 0.100 M = 0.125 M = 0.150
1.560 0.820 0.586 4.725 11.25 4.386 2.515
1.580 0.853 0.606 4.879 10.90 4.272 2.610
1.590 0.875 0.617 4.976 10.60 4.186 2.672
1.610 0.890 0.625 5.049 10.39 4.102 2.710
1.710 0.899 0.639 5.181 10.39 3.942 2.523
4. Technological Progress
Now we assume that company 1 has the possibility to invest in a project to 
decrease its carbon emissions. In return of an investment of Q > 0 the company 
can reduce its carbon emissions per produced unit of the homogenous good from 
? to ? 
 P , whereby 0 < P < ? . Obviously, this investment does not only 
have consequences for company 1. Due to the new cost structure, the optimal 
production quantity of all oligopolistic companies is changing (as described in 
Section 2). Let $3()4 denote the gain of company  after company 1 has 
invested in its carbon emission reduction given a certain demand () . If 
company 1 would not have invested before a time V, the expected present value 
3()4 of investing in V could be calculated as
3()4 = 
Q +   (%) "$3()4 
 3()4& z . (20)
Obviously, there is no good reason why company 1 would have to invest 
immediately. Instead, the company has the possibility to wait with the investment 
until the optimal investment time V$ . Please note, 3()4 depends on the 
demand parameter  but does not depend on time. From previous literature on real 
options (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Lukas and Welling, 2014) it is well 
known that in these cases it is optimally to invest as soon as the stochastic 
variable, i.e. in this model (), reaches a certain threshold $. Consequently, we 
get V$ = inf{  k| ()  $}. Furthermore, it is known, that
3($%)4 = (k)$ 
, (21)
whereby
 = 12 
 ON9 + B12 
 ON9D9 + 2MN9. (22)
Hence, we can determine the optimal investment threshold $ via
$ = 	MZf	gj6(%) () (k) 
. (23)
Obviously, $ depends on the carbon tax rate chosen by the government in k.
Thereby, it makes sense to write $() and V$(), i.e. to consider the optimal 
investment threshold and optimal investment time as a reaction (function) on the 
chosen tax rate . Figure 7 depicts this reaction function of company 1. As can be 
seen, the optimal investment threshold is decreasing in the carbon tax rate. Hence, 
the government could use the carbon tax rate as an investment incentive.
Figure 7: The reaction function of company 1.
Consequently, when optimizing the carbon tax rate the government should already 
take into account the reaction of company 1, i.e. its option to invest into the 
carbon emission reducing project. In particular, the government will choose 
$ = 	MZf	ghjk   (%%)Y((), )z
$(h)
%
+  (%%)Y((), )z
$(h) . (24)
Again, the model is solved via Monte-Carlo-Simulation. Analogously to equation 
(19) we define for each variable   {$, $, $, Y$, <$, ;$, |/$|} the variable
 $: = M A    (%%)$((), )z$(h)% +  (%%)¡$((), )z

$(h) , (25)
which again allows us tom compare the values with the settings in the previous 
Section. The results for the benchmark case are shown in Table 4. As we can see, 
the option of company 1 to invest in the carbon reducing technology leads to a 
higher optimal carbon tax rate. This can be explained by the fact that the 
government wants to give an incentive to invest in the project as it increases the 
eco-efficiency (as can be seen in Table 4). Furthermore, the higher carbon tax rate 
also leads to higher tax revenue. This effect dominates the effect of the higher 
carbon tax on the combined quantity offered on the oligopolistic market. 
However, the carbon emission reducing investment does not lead to an increased 
utility of the government. In particular, the market price of the homogenous good 
is increased due to the increased carbon tax rate.
Table 4: The option to invest in the carbon emissions reducing project.$ $($) Y¢$ <£ $  $ ;¤$ ¥$ _/¢ $_Benchmark 2.1 4.2 0.853 0.633 5.285 11.58 3.680 2.185
5. Conclusion
In this article we have set up a model of an oligopolistic market of polluters under 
a carbon tax scheme. We have analyzed the effect of the carbon tax on the 
oligopoly. In particular, the higher the carbon tax the lower the quantity offered, 
the lower the number of active companies in the oligopoly and the higher the 
market price of the homogenous good. Furthermore, the carbon tax succeeds in 
increasing the eco-efficiency and thereby in reducing carbon emissions. 
In a second step we have determined the optimal carbon tax rate - on one hand in 
a setting of constant demand, on the other hand in presence of demand 
uncertainty. We have analyzed the influence of various parameters on the optimal 
carbon tax rate. Regarding the influence of demand uncertainty, we found that 
demand uncertainty is good for the customers as it results in a lower market price, 
and a higher quantity offered. But demand uncertainty is definitively bad for the 
environment as it also leads to a lower eco-efficiency and a higher production.
Consequently, this results in higher carbon emissions. Paradoxically, demand 
uncertainty simultaneously leads to a lower optimal carbon tax rate. Finally, we 
introduced the possibility for a company to invest in a carbon emissions reducing 
project into the model. With the help of real option analysis we could determine 
the optimal tax rate under this setting. We found that the option to invest in the 
carbon emissions reducing project leads to an increasing optimal carbon tax rate. 
Thereby, the government can set a high incentive to invest early in the carbon 
saving technology. In particular, the option to reduce carbon emissions leads to a 
higher eco-efficiency of the oligopolistic industry. However, the influence of this 
option is bad for the consumer as it increases the market price of the homogenous 
good.
A weakness of the model and at the same time a possibility for future research lies 
in the fact that only one company in the oligopoly has the possibility to invest in 
reducing its carbon emissions. Of course, it would be more realistic if all 
companies or several companies had such an option. However, the complexity of 
the model would strongly increase with negative consequences for the possibility 
to still reasonably solve this model numerically. Nevertheless, it exists a research 
stream that successfully has modeled situations with competing real options of 
multiple players in oligopolies (see e.g. Pawlina and Kort, 2006; Mason and 
Weeds, 2010; Thijssen et al., 2012; Huisman and Kort, 2015); though usually 
under stronger assumptions regarding the oligopolistic companies. Maybe future 
research can successfully combine the setting of this article with parts of other 
model settings.
Further possibilities of future research are to allow the government to adjust the 
carbon tax rate at a certain time or at certain time steps to react on technological 
developments as well as on new data about carbon emissions. Likewise, the 
production and cost structure of the oligopolistic companies could be more 
realistic. In particular, fix costs could be included and carbon emissions per 
produced unit of the homogenous good should depend on the quantity produced. 
Finally, future research could apply the oligopoly-setting to the cap-and-trade 
scheme and maybe compare the influence of both schemes, i.e. cap-and-trade and 
carbon taxation, on oligopolies. 
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